Illusions Become Real in Iran

Reading the second-by-second online coverage of the Iranian election protests and realizing the sheer impact that these protests have had on the international community, I was reminded of one interesting piece that was published in November of last year titled “Use Your Illusions,” written by noted Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek. While I am not an acolyte of his, the argument in that particular essay was very poignant and surprisingly relevant to this new expression of political “idealism.” In a post-election commentary, Zizek answered Noam Chomsky's statement that “people should vote for Obama 'without illusions'” (questioning his propensity for real change), by embracing the symbolic impact of Obama's victory. He argues that:

In The Contest of Faculties, Kant asked a simple but difficult question: is there true progress in history? (He meant ethical progress, not just material development.) He concluded that progress cannot be proven, but we can discern signs which indicate that progress is possible. The French Revolution was such a sign, pointing towards the possibility of freedom: the previously unthinkable happened, a whole people fearlessly asserted their freedom and equality. For Kant, even more important than the – often bloody – reality of what went on on the streets of Paris was the enthusiasm that the events in France gave rise to in the eyes of sympathetic observers all around Europe and in places as far away as Haiti

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Obama’s victory is a sign of history in the triple Kantian sense of signum rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognosticum. A sign in which the memory of the long past of slavery and the struggle for its abolition reverberates; an event which now demonstrates a change; a hope for future achievements.

We are seeing the same “sign” of possible progress in Iran, where a large segment of the population is unwilling to accept the status quo as is, and is determined, even in the face of threats, violence and repression, to hope for freedom.

What is notable in these protests is the extent to which the symbolism of the Islamic Revolution “reverberates” within the movement. The shouts of Allahu Ackbar and the modest and sacred coloring of the “green” revolution seem to be a re-deployment of the ethic of 1979, this time against a regime that tries to draw its legitimacy from those events. This strategy evokes another one of Zizek's arguments, articulated in a chapter of his book, Law and the Postmodern Mind, titled “Why Does the Law Need an Obscene Supplement.” Although the piece is predominantly a psychoanalytic analysis of the function of law (with a heavy dose of Zizekian pop culture references), there is one passage at the end of the fifth section that is extremely applicable here. He states:

...the very fear of being co-opted that makes us search for more and more "radical," "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subversion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejection. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an outright atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat.

This is precisely the effect that the reformist movement is able to achieve in Iran. Because of its own co-option of the state's legitimacy (even attracting the support of some clerics within the system), it poses a far more dangerous threat to the current power structure than if it were simply a Westernized opposition group (which would easily be denounced as an agent of foreign influence or U.S. Hegemony, a violator of the “law”). The fact that Mousavi's campaign was uniquely internal and uniquely Iranian made it difficult for Khameni and the ruling elite to directly challenge him. The Guardian Council's approval of Mousavi's candidacy and Khameni's about-face call for a recount imply a certain level of confusion and uncertainty within the ruling establishment. Compared to a movement that simply transgresses authority (and is then cast out from the political sphere), the Mousavi candidacy was as Zizek describes, a more literal reading of the now subverted demands proclaimed during the revolt against the Shah:

When, in the late eighteenth century, universal human rights were proclaimed, this universality, of course, concealed the fact that they privilege white, men of property; however, this limitation was not openly admitted, it was coded in apparently tautological supplementary qualifications like "all humans have rights, insofar as they truly are. rational and free," " which then implicitly excludes the mentally ill, "savages," criminals, children, women.'. . So, if, in this situation, a poor black woman disregards this unwritten, implicit, qualification and demands human rights, also for herself, she just takes the letter of the discourse of rights "more literally than it was meant" (and thereby redefines its universality, inscribing it into a different hegemonic chain).

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Sometimes, at least, the most effective anti-ideological subversion of the official discourse of human rights consists in reading it in an excessively "literal" way, disregarding the set of underlying unwritten rules.

The nature of this movement and its source of legitimacy should not be lost on any politician or government official. The Obama administration's current strategy is prudent – issuing statements of empathy with universal values while leaving the judgement on the election in the hands of the Iranian public. Given the history of U.S. - Iranian relations and the extent to which Mousavi's movement is channeling a uniquely Iranian identity and the “letter” of the Islamic Revolution, any U.S. “involvement” would easily be twisted by the authorities as a symbol of western hegemony and interventionism. While, clearly, the Khameni government will, no matter what, attempt to scapegoat the U.S., without any factual basis, they are inherently undermined. The Iranian people do not follow Khameni blindly and unfounded spin on his part will only further reinforce his detached and alienated public image. Unfortunately, some politicians have decided, either naively or shrewdly, to brazenly insert themselves into the conversation. We are seeing Republican Rep. Mike Pence calling for a broad, sweeping moral U.S. backing of the protest movement. Senator McCain has expressed similar sentiments and Joe Lieberman is demanding a Reagan-esque “tear down this wall” proclamation.

Even if one assumes that there is something to be gained in a grand proclamation (a legitimate question and an issue debated within the movement), these particular “advocates” are definitely not the most genuine. One should recall that up until now, Ahmadinejad's nuclear crazy talk led many in the conservative foreign policy circle to “give up” on any constructive negotiations and instead threaten massive economic sanctions and even all-out war. These three individuals were likewise a part. Just one year ago, Mike Pence sponsored a resolution endorsing economic sanctions and isolation on the Iranian people, an act that, as he put it, would “take a stand against Iran.” John McCain joked about a bombing. Lieberman went as far as to actually suggest border strikes. All of these would have been interpreted as aggressive moves, fomenting anti-U.S. fervor and giving the hardliners even more power within the regime. It is strange that these supporters of the Iranian people would even consider such actions.

But the apparent hypocrisy here is a minor afterthought, almost expected as a result of the complete re-writing of the co-ordinates of American discourse on Iran. The sheer reversal of discourse here is not a time for simply indignation, but rather recognition of the power of these protests. One of Zizek's comments in “Use Your Illusions” is particularly useful here:

The paradigmatic cynic tells you confidentially: ‘But don’t you see that it is all really about money/power/sex, that professions of principle or value are just empty phrases which count for nothing?’ What the cynics don’t see is their own naivety, the naivety of their cynical wisdom which ignores the power of illusions.

The reason Obama’s victory generated such enthusiasm is not only that, against all odds, it really happened: it demonstrated the possibility of such a thing happening. The same goes for all great historical ruptures – think of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although we all knew about the rotten inefficiency of the Communist regimes, we didn’t really believe that they would disintegrate – like Kissinger, we were all victims of cynical pragmatism. Obama’s victory was clearly predictable for at least two weeks before the election, but it was still experienced as a surprise.

That is the real impact here. In the U.S. foreign policy circle, the protests have rattled the sense of cynicism around the Islamic Republic. Where simply years ago, some policymakers were ready to go to war with an unshakable, unmoving, irrational “enemy,” now, they are confronted with a dynamic, changing nation where the simple line of “containment” no longer functions. While the reformist fervor that fueled this movement was certainly existent and simmering within Iranian political culture for years, the internal “pragmatism” still assumed an unchanging administration, rejecting any agency on the part of the reformers.

But what is the significance of this movement? What will be the aftermath? The “pragmatic” commentators have begun to dissect it. The American Enterprise Institute's Danielle Pletka is already pronouncing it dead on arrival, calling it “little more than a symbolic protest, crushed by the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.” An article in Foreign Policy by Ranj Alaaldin stated that “anyone believing Mousavi would be the one to unclench the Iranian fist for a hand-in-hand partnership of peace with the United States is guilty of wishful thinking.” After noting Mousavi's anti-Western credentials, Alaaldin then shifts the argument to pure power politics, emphasizing the futility of Mousavi's position within the structure of the clerical leadership. While he concedes that the movement behind Mousavi could force the Supreme Leader to take public opinion into account and will live on, he ultimately dismisses such a “wishful” notion and suggests that Khameni will simply further his hardline position, a view bolstered by Khameni's most recent proclamations.

Yet something is missing here. What these analyses fail to consider is the fundamental framework change that a non-violent movement creates, something much more broad and idealistic than a question of power. The asymmetry between the state forces of Khameni and the protesters demonstrate the nature of a movement of ideals, a rewriting of the rules of the game. If one looks simply at a 'realist' analysis of power, it is clear that the state has the obvious upper-hand. Given the nature of modern military and security technology, it is impossible to confront any state on its own framework. What a non-violent movement of this type does, however, is reject the traditional mode of confrontation that states are accustomed to (war). By refusing to make the violent move that would legitimate state reprisal (on the grounds of security and self-defense, staples of the realist system), the protesters have shifted the battle away from a question of who has power to a question of who has legitimacy. Here, the protesters have already won, by nature of their own existence. Their message is a complete co-option of the “idealistic” pretenses behind the Khameni government's rule. It is a reading of the “letter” of Islam against a state that validates itself through religion. The vivid and global reach of the “green tide” has demonstrated that the reformists will not go unheard.

As Khameni's most recent speech has demonstrated, it is possible that the state will further crack down on the protesters. However, his hesitation (and pretenses toward concession) demonstrate the desperation in this act. By attacking a group that has established such credibility among the Iranian people, he will destroy any idealistic legitimacy behind a government rooted in the Islamic Revolution. If the reign and overthrow of the Shah is any example, Iranians, especially those who are politically active, will not allow a government based only in shows of force to continue. Ideology is integral.

The power of this movement lies in opening new possibilities by doing the impossible. Its actions are the Kantian “signs” that represent the possibility of progress, and the realization of ideals. While the world has yet to see what will be the outcome of the protests, it has undoubtedly experienced a sharp paradigm shift, a problematization of what it sees as “inevitable.” Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from Iran is how so often, what was once seen as irrational seems so sensible and easily rationalized once it occurs. As Zizek put it “A true act creates the conditions of its own possibility.”