Sexual Politics and the Nerd Subculture

I open this comment with a large digression from the actual subject of the piece to discuss the recent Sodini murders. One week ago, George Sodini shot three women in a Pittsburgh, PA gym before committing suicide. It is a tragedy that brings back echoes of the Ecole Polytechnique Massacre of 1989. As more information about the killing comes out, it becomes ever more clear that the mentality guiding Sodini's actions was deeply rooted in misogynistic ideas. It is easy to dismiss the actions of one deranged lunatic, it is not however, easy to ignore the more painful reality of how the dramatic, radicalized attitudes this man had toward women play themselves out in the broader culture. Jessica Yellin points out quite vividly a strain of misogyny even a public response to these murders. It is foolish to ignore the enabling ideologies behind this murder.

Looking into the reporting about the character of George Sodini reveals a dark theme of insecurity toward women, a theme that over time perpetuated a cascade of objectification and in the end a horrifying release. His diaries are laden with an attitude of self-loathing and a violent “desire” to be with women, ultimately turning them into objects for his anger and rage. But the “logic” underlying his “reasoning” (I use quotes here for an obvious purpose) is much more worrisome and should really spark a good deal of retrospection among both men and women as to what our social sexual norms are and how they can ultimately be harmful. Take this excerpt from his blog:

“Just got back from tanning, been doing this for a while. No gym today, my elbow is sore again. I actually look good. I dress good, am clean-shaven, bathe, touch of cologne - yet 30 million women rejected me - over an 18 or 25-year period. That is how I see it. Thirty million is my rough guesstimate of how many desirable single women there are. A man needs a woman for confidence. He gets a boost on the job, career, with other men, and everywhere else when he knows inside he has someone to spend the night with and who is also a friend.”

It is difficult to break down this particular instance of sexism and extrapolate. Things don't blend neatly into pre-packaged explanations of the world and especially when it comes to extreme cases like this one. But ultimately, this excerpt does bring into relief the sharp corners of many sexual norms that society takes for granted. The first sentence is the culmination of the hyper-real expectation of society that being a “man,” that fulfilling the definition of “masculinity” means working out, looking tan, being a physical god. He channels his inability to “score” with women into bolstering this faux-masculine image, convinced that this (as our culture's image systems have ingrained into men) is the way to get women. The converse to this is that without women, men are somehow “sub-masculine” and thus unworthy of their very being “man.” Underlying his last thoughts of why a “man needs a woman” is a sexual-cultural norm taken to its extreme, that masculinity is nothing without femininity to be objectified by it. These ideas are repeatedly confirmed through daily cultural bombardments: media sources, inter-personal communication, social roles, etc...

I'll leave the rest of the diary for readers to read if they wish as it is extremely grim. But if there's one thing to be taken away, it is that the fundamental definitions of masculinity and femininity that Sodini held are not simply the product of his deranged mind but of a repeated process of enculturation that tragically went too far. Now, I am not somehow “apologizing” for Sodini as some sort of “tragic” individual – no, the man is a monster and it is his agency that pulled the trigger. However, I think this incident should give people pause as to the inadvertently dangerous way assumptions we take for granted inform our decision-making, and the way in which we frame “desirability,” “masculinity,” “femininity,” “relationships,” and “sexuality” matter in a world where we want an end to macro and micro-violence in sexuality.

What brought this issue into a shocking sharp relief for me was the extent to which the “pick-up artist” culture twisted Sodini's view of women. Pandagon provides a run-down of the mentality here, that women are merely pawns to be manipulated by men for their own cynical games and sexual pleasure, because everyone knows that if men don't manipulate women, they'll merely be manipulated by them. In a strange perversion of the “pre-emptive war” paradigm, that “we” must attack “them” so “they” don't attack “us,” on a micro-level, this pick-up-artist strategy/culture is ultimately objectifying and Otherizing. As the Sodini case demonstrated, it is ultimately a violent rejection of empathy in order to avoid being a “Nice Guy” and instead be a power-hungry “Alpha Male.” And this is not some extrapolation of what the pick-up-artist “strategy” appears to be – this is literally what they preach.

Now, I'd like to separate my initial comments about Sodini from the rest of this essay in order to make it clear that I am not conflating his case with that of any other individuals. I will not be trying to compare “him” and his actions with anyone else's. At the beginning, I was not particularly focused on individuals, but on ideas – ideas that shape minds. My goal was to show that ideas matter and that these ideas have violent consequences. Please note that I am not seeking to “compare” anyone to Sodini, but rather search for ways that we can avoid tangling ourselves with sexist assumptions and thus risking their dangerous consequences. I don't see Sodini as some “twisted” victim who, if only he was accepted by women, wouldn't have shot up a dance class. Everyone who rejected him was right to, because he was the kind of guy who would have shot up a dance class.

Yet what made me continue this train of thought is the sad, connecting thread. Ultimately, that thread is “ideology,” if you will, the ideology of the pick-up-mentality and the fetishization of the “alpha male" that hovers at a distance from the "nerd" subculture at the intersection of sexual frustration and personal confidence. The reason this really struck a chord with me now is a recent thread of conversation held between two “nerd icons,” the creators of the popular webcomic Penny Arcade, Gabe (Mike Krahulik) and Tycho (Jerry Holkins). The discussion dealt with “Love Systems,” a 'dating guide' whose owners Tycho labeled “base manipulators” who have “made a cage of language that I can't escape from.” Gabe responded with “Love Systems doesn't seem so bad to me. It's really hard to talk to girls, and this is just helping guys with their confidence. “ This sparked a series of back-and-forths. I particularly liked Tycho's comment that:

I'm fairly certain the purpose of this course is to make you a better predator of women. Check out their offers of "in-field training," as though you were going to hunt antelopes from a jeep in the Goddamned Savannah.

Amid the humor, I began to realize that this is the kind of feminist conversation that I rarely see so vividly in “nerd” circles. Given the outcome, I think it is a conversation that we need to have MORE of within this subculture, but rarely give it a second thought because it is so tangential or seemingly irrelevant. Now, I would label myself as a man, as a feminist and as a nerd. The last two are rarely spoken of in the same sentence, but the stereotype of a “nerd” as a fundamentally asexual being, concerned more with videogames, comics, fantasy novels and the like is at its core a silencing one. As a community that is stereotypically predominantly male, we need to have a mature conversation about sub-cultural assumptions that sometimes get taken for granted. I am not going to say “all nerds are like X,” but sexual and relationship insecurity is pervasive within our subculture and we have to understand what assumptions go unstated in order to find constructive rather than destructive solutions.

The problem I think lies at the intersection of self-perpetuating, broad-sweeping, overly-general, norms of sexuality and social role. I found Gabe's last message particularly intelligently stated:

“I'm a little worried that guys reading the site might take our discussion here as some sort of endorsement and I want to make sure that isn't the case. While some of their advice is probably fine I think the majority of it is really sleazy. Again, I can't blame guys for seeking out help. All joking aside though, I just want to make it clear that I don't think the seduction community is the place to go. I understand how badly you want to believe that there is a system out there that if you can simply master will resolve your problems. Sadly I don't think that's the case and if there is such a system, it certainly isn't this one.”

Honestly, I really empathized with Gabe's story and struggle with anxiety. The socially-awkward social-outcast role is to some extent a part of the nerd identity. This manifests itself early in the clusterfuck of high school social politics and begins to run into the omnipresent force of puberty. While every individual begins to develop sexually, only certain “sexual” roles are permitted within the confines of the school culture. The “popular kids,” the “jocks” are the ones to have their “top-of-the-pack” masculinity confirmed while girls at that level are expected to assume the roles of “stupid,” “submissive,” and “self-absorbed” in order to fulfill what it means to be “feminine.” Those with alternate conceptions of sexuality are immediately consigned to be “beta male.” This constant reinforcement of what sexual relations are, of “how a man should act” and how “a woman should act” ingrain these assumptions into our minds, making it seem like, rather than a social construct, our sexual relations are immutable facts. This is ultimately the reasoning behind these “seduction systems,” that the “game” is an absolute fact of life and that only by playing it can one be a true “alpha male.”

Note that I speak in broad generalizations here particularly because that is how culture is transmitted. Everyone knows that “actual” high school is much more nuanced than that, but our culture communicates with this seemingly universal symbology of social role and clique. The stereotypes themselves become levels of analysis as we begin to use them to explain the world around us. No, High School is not like living through a John Hughes movie every single day, but the categories people place themselves and others in are still highly relevant.

So starting with the “beginning” of socio-sexual categorization, the high school (because honestly, that's where these “Breakfast Club” roles begin being defined), we see patterns being developed. Unfortunately, at the core, there is a tainted, distorted view of sexuality as domination, as manipulation as a game of antagonism rather than unity, cooperation and harmony. What we must avoid is playing into this game of “accepting the subjective world we see as fact” and trying to play the game as is regardless of the assumptions that we perpetuate. For those nerds seeking to ditch their “beta male” status and become dickish, aggressive “alphas” (as though we're somehow wolves fighting each other over mates), I urge a deep self-examination. At the point where one takes the mentality of “playing the game” to get women, one symbolically destroys “women” as persons and individuals and replaces them with caricaturized objects of self-satisfaction.

Going back to the Penny Arcade discussion, Tycho made a post a bit later with a message from a close “nerd” friend who had worked on these sorts of systems as a way for nerds to relate better to women. He states:

Mike noted that if it's guys "hunting women from the back of a jeep" he's not behind that. What does he (or you) think guys are doing every single time they go out to a bar or club? As my mother has noted during the times I wore a hair shirt about my job, Love Systems didn't invent the act of guys going out and trying to find girls to have sex with. We just gave guys the tools to do it effectively without boring girls. Our course lets guys make their own calls. For my part, I try to explain the ethical ramifications of hollow sexual interactions, and I try to emphasize the role that developing personal standards for the people with whom you surround yourself has in developing standards for yourself... But if a guy takes away scummy lessons, I am not there to change him. At my last bootcamp, though, there was a gentleman who had an MFA and poetry and ran a non-profit. I just don't see him as the sleazy guy at the bar with his chest hair poking out, you know? But he had just left a divorce, has two daughters he loves very much, and he wants to know how to interface with the modern world of dating. Mike happened to meet Kara in line at Star Wars. Romances spark at events like PAX and Comic Con. And some people-- most people-- are content to live day to day and luck into chemistry and attraction. But every guy has seen a girl who has taken his breath away, or been on a date that didn't end with a comic strip proposing marriage to her through his alter ego, a date where the girl decided, inexplicably, that she just wanted to be friends.

….

Our kind, the nerds, are the worst of the lot, man! How many girls did YOU have at your gaming table? They are thin on the ground in my weekly d20 modern group and in my XBox Live Friends list, and I don't think I'm overreaching with my anecdotal evidence when I say my experience is not abnormal. I'm sure we both have compelling reasons for WHY girls might steer clear of our favorite hobby, but the simple reality is that gaming, even when there are comparitively a LOT of girls, is still going to see WAY more men than women. It doesn't grant us the same male/female socialization tools that say, sports does.

This angle of reasoning, perpetuates the same flawed perspective of women as strange, fickle, random creatures that are so alien and unknown that we must dominate them to understand them. To say that women are “inexplicably” going to just want to be “friends” is to homogenize not only women but also sexuality. The underlying assumption is that the “friendship” means nothing, that “sexual intercourse” is the only fulfilling form of companionship that a man can have. It's an ultimately dangerous assumption in that it robs women of any agency in defining what a meaningful relationship is. It locks us into one way of looking at “love” and forbids us from exploring other possibilities.

In the end, let's pay attention to what the implications of our “means” are and if the “end” is really what we think it is. It's time to be aware of what our assumptions mean for other people.

We can't let an understandable desire for more confidence let us accept unacceptably violent characterizations of women just for the sake of feeling better about ourselves. It's a destructive way of viewing the world that ultimately does us more harm than good. Sure, it's easier to feel better about one's social skills if one accepts the belief that all women are stupid, manipulative and manipulated objects, but what kind of world is that? There is no dignity there.

I don't think it's necessarily “the world socializes us, we are merely pawns of broader society,” but rather “we choose to socialize ourselves; we choose to ingrain certain ideologies, the things we don't know we know, by our actions.” It is clear that our “realities” will be difficult to change. I know well enough that we can't magically fiat away social attitudes and the gender gap at the D&D table is indicative of the way our sub-culture has been socialized into the broader mainstream culture. At the beginning, we can start by problematizing the assumptions that go into the way society defines sexuality and human relationships.

Mainstream culture will always be stupid culture, but that doesn't mean we have to fall into the trap of playing by its rules. Nerdiness in it's socially awkward, but intellectual and analytical while still kind, endearing and intimate form is an alternate conception of sexuality that flies in direct contrast to the dehumanized “mating” so common to the traditional masculine/feminine binary. It's something to be embraced rather than disdained. We may play games, but we should know enough not to play this game. Game Over. It's time to reject appeals to that faux-masculinity and instead re-define masculinity in our own terms, on our own grounds. Nerdy doesn't have to mean not-sexy and women don't just have to be objects to be fawned and lusted for.

End Note: This was somewhat of a scattered, stream-of-consciousness piece because I found myself discussing two drastically different phenomena to a large extent unrelated except by the common “feminist” tie. Honestly, it seems somewhat strange and erratic, but I think has some relevant points.

Missing from this piece is the issue of GLBT identities and how they relate to the nerd community, another extremely relevant topic, but one that I have noticed has gained quite a bit of traction recently.

I am not trying to make accusations that the nerd community somehow “hates women” - I am however noting that we are missing an opportunity to introduce a new way of thinking about relationships that rejects superficiality. Perhaps the opening is a little too strong and tangential, but its connection to what the "pick-up-artist" mentality can inadvertently justify in the long run is something to consider.

Taking a Page From American Politics

Recently The Nation posted an interesting look into the machinations behind the Islamic Republic of Iran's upper political echelons. Specifically, it looked at the question of who might succeed Ayatollah Khameni as Supreme Leader:

People in the know in Iran report that the hottest subject of discussion among Iranian conservative leaders these days is the issue of who is to succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is said to be suffering from leukemia. The same individuals report that the person most likely to take Khamenei's mantle is Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the powerful chief of the Judiciary, whose tenure is scheduled to end within weeks.

The article suggests that Shahroudi's politics and jurisprudence are ambivalent, oscillating between a strict hard-line attitude and some progressive leanings, pointing out at the end that he is a critic of Ahmadinejad's power-grabs through the Revolutionary Guards.

An opponent of Ahmadinejad's hard-right politics...but still a conservative-leaning scholar - this portends a vexing future for Iranian governance and what direction it will take. Will Ahmadinejad have to confront Shahroudi for political leverage?

All of these questions are legitimate. However, I'm not going to look at the implications of this right now...I'm going to consider something a little more superficial and humorous.

The name.

Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi

Shahroudi

Shah.

Ring any bells.

Since Ahmadinejad has taken to completely plagiarizing American political slogans, perhaps he, or his organization, can consider borrowing a baseless political smear tactic from this election season's playbook, the "scary-sounding-name."

It's something that we in the States saw during the nascent stages of Barack Hussein Obama's campaign, posted on blogs when there was nothing else good to write about.

Perhaps Ahmadinejad can use his army of bloggers to start a new Iranian Political meme:

"Are we sure that can we trust Mahmoud SHAHroudi? What isn't he telling us about his past associations? Should we really have a Supreme Leader with a name so eerily similar to THIS MAN'S TITLE!

Obviously, he can't do it himself - it's always best to have some plausible deniability when resorting to hit-and-run politics. But this is Ahmadinejad - if he can deny the Holocaust, he'll have no trouble with something of this caliber.

I am sure that this new media weapon will be as successful against Shahroudi as it was against Obama.

The Banality of Wiretapping

Recently, I decided to finally watch Frost/Nixon. While I did enjoy it, throughout the entire film, I had a nagging, somewhat bothersome irking feeling in the back of my brain. It wasn't the artistic license, that was tolerable for a drama. I simply could not figure it out until I sat down at my computer, launched Firefox, and began flipping through news sites.

This.

It almost seems comical, that, of course, Cheney would somehow be involved in this CIA coverup. Comical? Is that the word for it? Unfortunately so. That's when I realized what was bothering me about Frost/Nixon.

In light of everything the Bush Administration did in regards to secrecy and surveillance, the "seriousness" surrounding Nixon in the film seemed almost camp, overly-dramatic. All of it, from the archetypal "angry leftist" played by Sam Rockwell who spends his entire life following and profiling Nixon to expose his "criminality" to the Nixon character himself who breaks down in a long-winded, impassioned confession about his horrible, atrocious involvement in Watergate felt so entirely fake. It leaves the post-2008 audience asking the question: "Is that it? All of that commotion about one coverup?"

Watergate just isn't enough anymore. The tragic figure of Richard Nixon, who laments his betrayal of the public trust, gives way to the post-modern absurdity of Richard Cheney, who simply asserts his prerogative of secrecy with no compunctions or remorse and with little regard to the merits of his argument.

The most absurd schism is the whole idea of "confession." Throughout the film, the characters supporting Frost are desperate in their single-minded focus of giving "Nixon the trial he never had," of making him confess his wrong-doing to the American public. We on the other hand will never get such a cathartic moment out of Dick Cheney because there is nothing to confess. He, on live television, has already admitted having endorsed torture. He is open about his penchant for clandestine security measures. There is nothing for Cheney to hide in his brazen defense of his percieved rightness. Because of this, it is unlikely that we will ever see a weeping Cheney worrying that children will grow up viewing politics as corrupt and criminal.

At the same time, perhaps we have grown overly accustomed to the "Bush/Cheney = shady dealings" equation that we've come to accept it and for expediency's sake cast it off into the past. Given the problems facing the Obama administration and the world, the scrapping of investigations into Bush Administration actions demonstrated a new political culture. Instead of "justice for all, at any cost" we now ignore "petty" crimes in order to desperately try to prevent everything from becoming even worse. The bar for "criminality" becomes greater.

I recall in 2006 the myriad of comparisons between Nixon's wiretapping and the new revelations of Bush's expanded wiretapping program. Seeing how the two resolved themselves, I think the similarities have broken down in the aftermath. Or, perhaps, history is following Marx's observations that everything happens twice, "first as tragedy, then as farce." Except in this case, Herbert Marcuse's corollary is particularly ominous, that the farce is tremendously more terrifying than the tragedy.

The Constitutional Question in Honduras

The ouster of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya by military force and the order of the Honduran Supreme Court has brought to the media forefront the spectre of governance by military coup in a region whose history is wrought with such power struggles (often featuring United States involvement). But behind the inter-branch conflict that precipitated the military abduction of Zelaya lies a set of constitutional questions facing the Honduran government. The entire crisis was brought to a flashpoint when Zelaya rejected court orders to not conduct his proposed non-binding public consultation on the issue of calling a constitutional convention. Perceived as the beginning of a move to repeal the constitutionally protected presidential term limit, the poll was ruled unconstitutional. From there flowed a cascade of accusations of illegality with both sides claiming that only they are acting within the confines of the constitution. Zelaya fired his top general for refusing to carry out the military's role in voting logistics. The general refused to co-operate, citing the Supreme Court's ruling. The Supreme Court demanded that the general be re-instated and finally, the court ordered the army to remove Zelaya from office.

Here I will try to examine how the actions taken by Zelaya, the Military, the Congress and the Supreme Court function in the context of the Honduran constitution and what it means for the legality of their actions. I am by no means a legal scholar (and am definitely not a Honduran legal analyst), but this is an issue that warrants an examination beyond regional stereotypes and hyperbolic caricatures of the events of this constitutional crisis.

First, the issues surrounding the armed forces. Given the historical prevalence of military reign in Central/South American, the Honduran constitution, interestingly enough, has specific provisions to attempt to prevent the "legality" of military takeovers independent of civilian control. For example, Article 240 states in part:

No pueden ser elegidos Presidente ni Vicepresidente de la República

...

2. Los oficiales jefes y oficiales generales de las Fuerzas Armadas;

3. Los jefes superiores de las Fuerzas Armadas y Cuerpos de Policía o de Seguridad del Estado;

4. Los militares en servicio activo y los miembros de cualquier otro cuerpo armado que hayan ejercido sus funciones durante los últimos doce meses anteriores a la fecha de elección

Translated, this means that no Armed Forces/State Security commander can be elected president or vice president (regular active members of the Armed Forces must not be affiliated with them for 12 months prior to the election). This Article, combined with the explicit endorsement of presidential control of the military in Article 277, attempts to prevent military coups from legitimizing their rule. This is why the military's actions against Zelaya required the backing of civilian actors and why Micheletti, rather than a military general, is now the interim president, making this coup much different than a simple military claim to power a la Pinochet.

But is this military action, which was sanctioned by the Supreme Court, constitutional? Apart from the technicalities of the civilian-military relationship in Honduras, the “spirit” of the way in which the constitution depicts the military implies its non-use as a tool of law enforcement and in internal matters (weakening the temporary administration's case for the coup). References to the military are meant to separate it from the civilian domain (or keep it under civilian control), as in the prohibitions on generals and military officials running for the presidency or for Congress. Other examples include Article 37, which states:

Los ciudadanos de alta en las Fuerzas Armadas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado no podrán ejercer el sufragio, pero si serán elegibles en los casos no prohibidos por la Ley.

Citizens of high rank in the Armed Forces and State Security bodies are not able to exercise the right to vote, but are eligible in cases not prohibited by the law (that last clause is difficult to interpret, I do not know if it is referencing voter eligibility or candidacy eligibility). This article suggests a drastic split between the military and political spheres (denying military officials the basic tool of decision (the vote) in domestic political disputes). In addition, Article 293 states:

La Policía Nacional es una institución profesional permanente del Estado, apolítica en el sentido partidista de naturaleza puramente civil, encargada de velar por la conservación del orden público, la prevención, control y combate al delito; proteger la seguridad de las personas y sus bienes; ejecutar las resoluciones, disposiciones, mandatos y decisiones legales de las autoridades y funcionbarios públicos, todo con estricto respeto a los derechos humanos.

This excerpt declares that the National Police is the body responsible for carrying out legal decisions by public authorities. According to Article 272, the military only cooperates with the police in maintaining public order (I would interpret this specifically as riot control and the like, not as a general, catch-all term). Nowhere in Section 10, the section on national defense and security, is there any justification for using the military to carry out legal decisions.

So the case that the Supreme Court is making for justifying the expulsion of Zelaya by military means as a legal, police action is undermined not only by the implied separation of military and state, but also by the explicit delegation of such responsibilities to the National Police.

The other military-constitutional issue relates to Zelaya's dismissal of general Romeo Velasquez for refusing to provide logistics for the vote. The military's rejection of Zelaya's referendum order has a constitutional defense. Article 323 states:

Ningún funcionario o empleado, civil o militar, está obligado a cumplir órdenes ilegales o que impliquen la comisión de delito.

No employee, civil or military, is obligated to obey illegal orders or those that would involve the commission of a crime. Because the Supreme Court ruled the referendum illegal, the head of the army was technically within his limits to reject Zelaya's demand to assist in carrying out the polling (the Supreme Court is the arbiter and interpreter of the law).

However, the issue of Velasquez's removal is much more vague. The constitution articulates the power of the President to select and remove the general of the Armed Forces in Article 280:

El Secretario(a) de Estado en el Despacho de Defensa Nacional, será nombrado o removido libremente por el presidente de la República; en igual forma lo será el Jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, quien será seleccionado por el Presidente de la República, entre los miembros que integran la Junta de Comandantes de las Fuerzas Armadas, de conformidad con lo que establece el Escalafón de Oficiales, prescrito en la Ley Constitutiva de las Fuerzas Armadas.

The first part of the Article states that “The Secretary of National Defense will be named or removed freely, by the President of the Republic, likewise, so will the General Commander of the Army.” The addition of the word “freely” implies that discretion lies solely within the presidency regardless of motive. While the Supreme Court has denounced the President's dismissal of Velasquez, there do potentially exist constitutional grounds for Zelaya's actions.

As a side note, the nature of the Supreme Court and how the Justices themselves are selected may also be relevant here, not in resolving the constitutional questions but in understanding what political pressures are involved. According to Article 311:

Los Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, serán electos por el Congreso Nacional, con el voto favorable de las dos terceras partes de la totalidad de sus miembros,

Justices of the Supreme Court are elected by the National Congress with a 2/3 vote of the entirety of its members. Furthermore, according to Article 314:

El período de los Magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia será de siete (7) años a partir de la fecha en que presten la promesa de Ley, pudiendo ser reelectos.

Supreme Court Justices serve 7 year terms and can be re-elected. In this way, because the Supreme Court is both elected by a parliamentary body and is subject to the pressures of re-election, it is in a position to be politicized and deferential to the Congress. There is this added dimension that makes the root of this crisis appear to be an executive/legislative power struggle with the Supreme Court choosing to side with its “political constituency.”

The controversy surrounding Zelaya's revolves primarily around his overtures to amend the constitution to remove the executive term limits, an amendment deemed unconstitutional by Article 374:

No podrán reformarse, en ningún caso, el artículo anterior, el presente artículo, los artículos constitucionales que se refieren a la forma de gobierno, al territorio nacional, al período presidencial, a la prohibición para ser nuevamente Presidente de la República, el ciudadano que lo haya desempeñado bajo cualquier título y el referente a quienes no pueden ser Presidentes de la República por el período subsiguiente.

It states that one cannot alter the following parts of the constitution:

• Articles 373 and 374

• The articles that refer to the form of government

• The articles regarding national territory

• The articles regarding presidential term

• The prohibition on the President of the Republic twice

• Who can serve under what title

• Who cannot be the Presidents of the Republic

The actual Article 239 which covers this prohibition states quite clearly:

El que quebrante esta disposición o proponga su reforma, así como aquellos que lo apoyen directa o indirectamente, cesarán de inmediato en el desempeño de sus respectivos cargos y quedarán inhabilitados por diez (10) años para el ejercicio de toda función pública.

Anyone who violates this provision or proposes its reform, along with those who support them directly or indirectly, will immediately cease the the discharge of their respective duties and will be disqualified for 10 years from exercising any public function.

This is a notable strike against Zelaya. The constitution not only bans two-term executives or the amendment of that article, but it bans the very proposition of any reform of that rule. Thus, even if Zelaya did nothing legally, Zelaya's intentions could be unconstitutional, an odd proposition.

However, the phrase “propose its reform” is somewhat vague. Does it ban any speech or statement in that regard? Or does it ban simply legal propositions/amendments/decrees?

The word “proponga” (from the verb “proponer”) is key here. The best translation would be “propose” (rather than suggest which is more closely tied to the word “sugerir”). Because of the legal context, “propose” refers specifically to the introduction of legal acts such as decrees or bills in Congress rather than simply to “anything said by anyone.” That interpretation sets up a much clearer bright-line as to what is legal and illegal. Also, the first interpretation, at its broadest, would contradict Article 72, which codifies freedom of thought/freedom of the press (it would be an absurd exception – you can talk about anything except for this one constitutional provision).

On the contrary, Article 42 specifies that a citizen loses their citizenship if they incite, support or promote the re-election of a president. This would give some weight to the former interpretation (intent over legality), but the context implies the active promotion of a particular candidate rather than the more abstract suggestion of a constitutional modification.

On a tangential note, this stripping of citizenship requires a conviction, giving credence to the argument that Zelaya's opponents should have used the court system rather than seizing him militarily.

The “proposal” that sparked the controversy and became associated with the issue of term limits was this non-binding ballot question:

¿Está de acuerdo que en las elecciones generales de 2009 se instale una cuarta urna en la cual el pueblo decida la convocatoria a una asamblea nacional constituyente? = Sí…….ó………..No.

Translated: “Do you agree with the installation of a fourth ballot box during the 2009 general elections so that the people can decide on the calling of a national constituent assembly? Yes or no.”

There is nothing in this question that proposes a reform of Article 239 of the constitution. So from a purely textual interpretation (which tries to exclude the messy politics of the situation), Zelaya is clear. Because I cannot account for the vagueness and politicization of a broader interpretation of the Article that would seek to discern Zelaya's overall intent or mentality, I will leave that question for the end. I will comment that there is a crucial constitutional issue here and that Zelaya may not be 100% innocent and certainly should have to face legal challenges.

However, the poll itself (sans term limits) does introduce further legal conundrums.

First is the “binding” vs. “non-binding” question. Zelaya has asserted that the referendum is legally non-binding after having a “binding” proposal ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. If the referendum were “binding,” then it would be a standard, legitimate plebiscite (which will have force of law) and thus would have to follow all of the rules set out in Article 5 of the constitution.

However, if it is non-binding, then there are no constitutional prescriptions for carrying out such a poll. Yet the poll does possess a legal basis within the Honduran “Ley de Participacion Ciudadana” or “Civil Participation Act”

The rough translation of the relevant parts of Article 5 of the Civil Participation Act is as follows:

Citizen initiatives are a mechanism for participation in which a citizen can present the following requests and initiatives:

1) Request that the heads of public organs and agencies of whatever power of the State (branch of government) convene the public in general, the neighbors of a municipality, a neighborhood or district, labor unions or organized social groups or sectors in order to submit opinions and formulate proposals to resolve collective problems. The results are not binding, but serve as guidelines for the functioning of the convening body.

…

These citizen initiatives can be started not only by individual citizens but also civil associations, businesses, unions or whatever other social group.

So Zelaya does have the authority to consult the public in that manner. Yet there is the issue of the legality of “Constitutional Convention.” The constitution immutably sets out the ways in which the constitution can be amended through legislative initiative in Article 373, by a legislative super-majority or a decree approved by a super-majority. There is nothing in the constitution regarding the formation of a Constitutional Convention (even though such a convention did originally write it).

However, even if the “content” of the question deals with unconstitutional elements, it is largely irrelevant due to the non-binding nature of the poll and the lack of restrictions on what the government is allowed to consult on in the Civil Participation Act. Even if the consultation is affirmative, it does not mean that a convention would be convened, it would simply be a way for Zelaya to put political pressure on Congress.

One interesting thing to note is that given his strategy, Zelaya would not be the beneficiary of any removal of term limits. An actual referendum on a constitutional convention, if approved, would be on the ballot in November, the same time as the Presidential election, meaning that Zelaya would still be unable to run for President. Given the amount of time needed to coordinate such an assembly, it would be unable to do anything before the end of Zelaya's term in January. The only way he would be able to “run again” is if the Constitutional Convention somehow retroactively allowed him to, a modification that would never pass given the level of political opposition Zelaya faces.

The final key issue is that of the constitutionality of how the conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court. The part of the Constitution that sets the framework for governance when the Constitution has lost its force, the “post-constitutional” situation, is Article 375:

Esta Constitución no pierde su vigencia ni deja de cumplirse por acto de fuerza o cuando fuere supuestamente derogada o modificada por cualquier otro medio y procedimiento distintos del que ella mismo dispone. En estos casos, todo ciudadano investido o no de autoridad, tiene el deber de colaborar en el mantenimiento o restablecimiento de su afectiva vigencia.

Serán juzgados, según esta misma constitución y las leyes expedidas en conformidad con ella, los responsables de los hechos señalados en la primera parte del párrafo anterior, lo mismo que los principales funcionarios de los gobiernos que se organicen subsecuentemente, si no han contribuido a restablecer inmediatamente el imperio de esta Constitución y a las autoridades constituidas conforme a ella. El Congreso puede decretar con el voto de la mayoría absoluta de sus miembros, la incautación de todo o parte de los bienes de esas mismas personas y de quienes se hayan enriquecido al amparo de la suplantación.

My translation:

This constitution does not lose its validity nor stops being enforced when it is supposedly derogated or modified by some other means or procedure distinct from those it allows. In these cases, all citizens, given government authority or not, have the duty to work to maintain and re-establish its legitimacy.

Those responsible for the acts designated in the previous paragraph, as well as those civil servants in the government organized thereafter if they have not contributed to the immediate re-establishment of the power and authority of the constitution, will be judged by the same constitution and laws set in compliance with it. The Congress can decree, with a majority vote of all of its members, the seizure of all of the property of these same individuals and of those who have become enriched under the suspension (of the Constitution).

While it does state that “all citizens” must “re-establish” the constitution's legitimacy, it provides no actual defined means of what is legal in this “temporary” government or what actions should be taken based on the extent of the violation of the constitution. So the interim government justifies the coup on the grounds that they were restoring constitutional rule after Zelaya “violated” it.

However, if the temporary government is shown to have also committed unconstitutional acts (the use of the military to depose the elected executive or the suspension of civil liberties), then they would be equally liable for prosecution for holding back the immediate re-establishment of constitutional authority.

The legality of the interim government thus comes into serious question both because of its dubious origins and its dubious actions. Since the coup, the Congress has suspended some of the articles of the Constitution pertaining to civil liberties, likely justifying it on the grounds established in Article 187:

El ejercicio de los derechos establecidos en los artículos 69, 71, 72, 78, 81, 84, 93, 99 y 103, podrán suspenderse en vaso de invasión del territorio nacional, perturbación grave de la paz, de epidemia o de cualquier otra calamidad general, por el Presidente de la República, de acuerdo con el Consejo de Ministros, por medio de un Decreto que contendrá:

The constitution specifies that these certain articles may only be suspended in times of a “grave disturbance of the peace” or a “general calamity” by “the President of the Republic with the agreement of his cabinet. The legislature's actions suspend Articles 69, 71, 78, 81, which pertain to freedoms of association, movement, and habeas corpus, during periods of curfew.

The irony of this situation is that the legislature is invoking its powers to suspend personal liberties on the grounds of a “grave disturbance of the peace” that it helped create by accepting the coup. In this regard, the classification of the protests against the unelected coup government as such a national calamity is a highly politicized decision.

Also Micheletti's strange position as unelected president puts into question the legitimacy of his use of decree to invoke Article 187. While technically, the president is imbued with these powers in times of emergency (the constitution is non-specific to the cause of this emergency), he may come to regret his decision to temporarily abrogate certain articles. To put it plainly, he is pushing the limits of his authority. Acting dramatically outside of the constitution right now may have drastic consequences for attempting to legitimize his rule.

In the end, weighing the constitutional damage wrought by both sides shows that while the two parties, Zelaya and his opponents, broke the law, the depths of the violations are drastically different. Mel Zelaya's constitutional problems revolve around the advocacy of his consultation referendum and potentially of changing the presidential term limits and the firing of his top military commander. On the other hand, the interim government is challenged by the seemingly blatantly unconstitutional (or at least extra-constitutional) military deposition of the executive and its suspension of liberties, acts not keeping with the speedy restoration of constitutional authority.

The most severe accusations against Zelaya are the implications within Article 239. The other issues are much smaller in comparison given valid competing interpretations of the constitution. Because of the illegality of any proposal to reform Article 239 along with the reform itself, the speculation surrounding Zelaya's intentions to repeal the term limit, Zelaya may be in breach of the constitution. However, even then, it is still a debatable issue given the non-existence of any “legal” proposition on Zelaya's part to amend Article 239. Even the controversial non-binding referendum made no mention of it. Thus, Zelaya's guilt or innocence depends on how the “propose a reform” clause of Article 239 is interpreted, a question that at the very least, requires further study. Had the Supreme Court brought legal proceedings against Zelaya or waited for him to indisputably violate Article 239 before taking action, this situation would be much more different.

Because while there is only a risk that Zelaya breached the constitution, the coup has already been committed and its legitimacy rests on the idea that Zelaya is 100% guilty of violating the constitution. Otherwise, there are no legal provisions within the constitution for the deposition of any government official by military means. It is entirely “extra-constitutional.” The sheer gravity of the forceful take- of a branch of government by another breaks the boundaries of what is legal and what is not. Considering that the Supreme Court did endorse the coup and gave orders to the military, it is very possible that the Court is acting unconstitutionally by usurping executive power over the armed forces. However, there is currently no way to correct that as long as the Congress, the body that appoints the justices, supports the coup. Thus, we have a paradox, where the body responsible for determining what is legal also can rule on the legality of its own actions without any challenges, breaking checks and balances.

So in the somewhat absurd calculus underpinning this situation (having to decide what is more unconstitutional), the severity of the coup and its dubious grounds outweigh the underdeveloped case against Zelaya. Furthermore, by choosing to unconstitutionally depose Zelaya, the Supreme Court has dramatically weakened its case against Zelaya (which sans-coup could have been viable).

The vagueness of the constitution, both in defining the illegality of Zelaya's propositions and in the response of Congress and the Courts limits the extent to which legal analysis can answer the “legitimacy” questions and turns this situation into more of a naked power struggle. The constitution says little about how to resolve inter-branch conflicts and even less about what to do when the constitution has been suspended. There is no definite legal way to resolve this crisis when all parties involved have to some degree lost their constitutional legitimacy.

The most ironic part of these events is that because of the failure of the constitution to resolve this crisis, it is very possible that a constitutional convention may in, in the end, have to be convened.

Humor: Hoekstras

The unique communication structure that the Iranian protesters adopted provoked much commentary and analysis across the globe regarding the impact of so-called "Web 2.0" technologies. However, as is often the case, it led to a number of completely inane statements from U.S. lawmakers.

As chronicled and mocked in this particular Daily Show clip, GOP Representative Pete Hoekstra tweeted a direct comparison between Republican twittering during a parliamentary dispute with the Democrats and the Iranian use of Twitter to coordinate protests. A similar theme was echoed by Republican John Culberson.

Iranian Protesters are similar to GOP Congressmen? Well...there are eerie likenesses. Both are bi-pedal mammals. They breathe air and require food to survive. Unlike birds and reptiles who lay eggs, females of their species give birth to live young. That's about all I can think of.

While this is not Hoekstra's first Twitter-fail, it certainly was amazingly absurd. So like all crazy ideas that are virally repeatable, infinitely modifiable and constantly hilarious...Pete Hoekstra is now an Internet Meme.

As part of my contribution to this internet phenomenon, here are 5 original new "Hoekstras"

1. Had to wake up early to catch a plane, now know exactly how Manuel Zelaya feels.
2. Parents sent me to camp as a kid, felt like Alexandr Solzhenytsin
3. The vending machine ate my dollar; it's just like Bernie Madoff
4. My morning toast got burned; like I survived the Great Chicago Fire.
5. Ran out of baked potatoes, reminded me of the Irish Great Famine.

Add your own!

A Victory for Basic Human Decency

Thursday's 8-1 Supreme Court ruling in Safford Unified School District v. April Redding, led me to breathe an exasperated sigh of relief. "At least they didn't screw up THIS one!"

On face, the facts of the case were quite stark and seemingly unjustifiable. Then 13-year-old Savana Redding was strip-searched by her school administrators in a desparate search for illegal ibuprofen. While the assistant principal and nurse involved in the search were acting on a "tip" from another student, no drugs were found. A clear-cut example of the administration over-reaching its power in loco parentis.

Yet this particular case made it all the way to the Supreme Court, implying that United States legal system deemed it worthy of debate. It was portrayed as a question of the school's interests in preserving order vs. a student's right to privacy. Regardless of the non-existence of any substantive burden of proof or, for that matter, drugs, this school decided to push ahead with litigation and actually recieved one Justice's "ballot."

When the Supreme Court heard the case in April, the absurdity of the argumentation and the conduct of some of the justices put the outcome of the case into question. Dahlia Lithwick's piece in Slate describes very colorfully the baudy and sophomoric dialogue within the Court's chambers. That Justice Scalia lacked a certain degree of seriousness and respect when he exclaimed "You've searched everywhere else. By God, the drugs must be in her underpants!" or that Justice Bryer seemed to slip into recalling his strange childhood when he stated "In my experience when I was 8 or 10 or 12 years old, you know, we did take our clothes off once a day, we changed for gym, OK? And in my experience, too, people did sometimes stick things in my underwear," made me worry that highest court in the land would not take the humiliation and emotional damage wrought on Ms. Redding seriously.

So I am glad that the majority of the Justices likely looked back at those arguments with some level of disgust.

But the case is a drastic example of a problematic issue within the school system. The sheer irrationality of the administration's actions points to a certain paranoia within modern school administrative circles and even more-so, a fundamental disconnect between administrators and students. As school systems face problems, both in terms of overall success and the high-stakes testing system that they live in, the desire for order and rigidity becomes paramount within the minds of administrators. In order to maximize "efficiency" given limited resources, administrators emphasize discipline and try to eliminate anything that would subvert the "learning environment." It's a legitimate concern, but while the punishment/restriction-centered approach may "crack down" in the short-term, in the long-run, it only alienates an already rebellious and aggravated student body and results in a twisted logic of order uber alles that would justify what happened to Savana Redding. When students already perceive "school" as a distant and inhuman body (even if they may make valuable connections with individual teachers), an aggressive, power-hungry administration only emboldens their resistance.

I recall a few absurd (but never nearly as horrendous as this incident) occasions where my High School's administrators took "drastic" actions to avert what they perceived as "disruptions." When rumor broke out that a water fight was being planned in-between classes, one of our principals chose to ban all water in the hallways. Anyone carrying a bottle would be disciplined and water sales in the cafeteria were halted. For those of us who appreciated being hydrated, it was somewhat of an inconvenience, and the sudden and exorbitant nature of the PA announcement sent waves of bemused laughter throughout the student body. "Water? Really?"

No one in my class had any prior knowledge of any "planned" fight, so we were left wondering how the administration had received the tip. Maybe someone, somewhere was planning something, but reasonable doubt took a backseat to preventing this supposed threat to stability.

A similar (but more expansive) mentality existed within the Savana Redding case. The supposed "tip" that justified (in the administrators' minds) the strip search was fabricated. There was no further evidence against Ms. Redding, but the fear of "DRUGS!!!," the perennial bogeyman of school admins everywhere, led to the horrendously intrusive search. In as sense, this echoed the same logic Dick Cheney articulated in his "One Percent Doctrine" (coined by Ron Suskind in his book). No matter how unlikely the threat is, it must be treated as though it were the end of the world. It is a logic that presumes that the actions taken have no consequences in proportion to the threat perceived, so that anything is justified. Reality be damned.

At the same time, the student is reduced to an amoral figure concerned only with disrupting the functioning of the school through subversion and illicit behavior rather than an actual moral agent capable of understanding right and wrong. This dehumanizing construct only deepens the student-administration conflict. Students are angry with an uncaring, rigid and faceless system that controls their daily lives. Administrators are frustrated with an uncooperative and disruptive student body. As schools shift toward police-state tactics (with dramatic outliers like this case pushing the boundaries of their power over the student body), they over-concentrate on the pursuit of order and lose the fundamental reason for their existence, education.

We do not live in Prussia. Students are people too. Administrators should not attempt to justify total control over their students' lives. That only fuels more non-compliance on the part of a frustrated student body and makes schools appear like work camps rather than centers for free thought and learning. They instead must open up an honest dialogue with students regarding issues of "order" and be open to criticism and complaints about their policies. Education is a cooperative venture, not a one-way flow of information.

Illusions Become Real in Iran

Reading the second-by-second online coverage of the Iranian election protests and realizing the sheer impact that these protests have had on the international community, I was reminded of one interesting piece that was published in November of last year titled “Use Your Illusions,” written by noted Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek. While I am not an acolyte of his, the argument in that particular essay was very poignant and surprisingly relevant to this new expression of political “idealism.” In a post-election commentary, Zizek answered Noam Chomsky's statement that “people should vote for Obama 'without illusions'” (questioning his propensity for real change), by embracing the symbolic impact of Obama's victory. He argues that:

In The Contest of Faculties, Kant asked a simple but difficult question: is there true progress in history? (He meant ethical progress, not just material development.) He concluded that progress cannot be proven, but we can discern signs which indicate that progress is possible. The French Revolution was such a sign, pointing towards the possibility of freedom: the previously unthinkable happened, a whole people fearlessly asserted their freedom and equality. For Kant, even more important than the – often bloody – reality of what went on on the streets of Paris was the enthusiasm that the events in France gave rise to in the eyes of sympathetic observers all around Europe and in places as far away as Haiti

…

Obama’s victory is a sign of history in the triple Kantian sense of signum rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognosticum. A sign in which the memory of the long past of slavery and the struggle for its abolition reverberates; an event which now demonstrates a change; a hope for future achievements.

We are seeing the same “sign” of possible progress in Iran, where a large segment of the population is unwilling to accept the status quo as is, and is determined, even in the face of threats, violence and repression, to hope for freedom.

What is notable in these protests is the extent to which the symbolism of the Islamic Revolution “reverberates” within the movement. The shouts of Allahu Ackbar and the modest and sacred coloring of the “green” revolution seem to be a re-deployment of the ethic of 1979, this time against a regime that tries to draw its legitimacy from those events. This strategy evokes another one of Zizek's arguments, articulated in a chapter of his book, Law and the Postmodern Mind, titled “Why Does the Law Need an Obscene Supplement.” Although the piece is predominantly a psychoanalytic analysis of the function of law (with a heavy dose of Zizekian pop culture references), there is one passage at the end of the fifth section that is extremely applicable here. He states:

...the very fear of being co-opted that makes us search for more and more "radical," "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subversion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejection. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an outright atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat.

This is precisely the effect that the reformist movement is able to achieve in Iran. Because of its own co-option of the state's legitimacy (even attracting the support of some clerics within the system), it poses a far more dangerous threat to the current power structure than if it were simply a Westernized opposition group (which would easily be denounced as an agent of foreign influence or U.S. Hegemony, a violator of the “law”). The fact that Mousavi's campaign was uniquely internal and uniquely Iranian made it difficult for Khameni and the ruling elite to directly challenge him. The Guardian Council's approval of Mousavi's candidacy and Khameni's about-face call for a recount imply a certain level of confusion and uncertainty within the ruling establishment. Compared to a movement that simply transgresses authority (and is then cast out from the political sphere), the Mousavi candidacy was as Zizek describes, a more literal reading of the now subverted demands proclaimed during the revolt against the Shah:

When, in the late eighteenth century, universal human rights were proclaimed, this universality, of course, concealed the fact that they privilege white, men of property; however, this limitation was not openly admitted, it was coded in apparently tautological supplementary qualifications like "all humans have rights, insofar as they truly are. rational and free," " which then implicitly excludes the mentally ill, "savages," criminals, children, women.'. . So, if, in this situation, a poor black woman disregards this unwritten, implicit, qualification and demands human rights, also for herself, she just takes the letter of the discourse of rights "more literally than it was meant" (and thereby redefines its universality, inscribing it into a different hegemonic chain).

...

Sometimes, at least, the most effective anti-ideological subversion of the official discourse of human rights consists in reading it in an excessively "literal" way, disregarding the set of underlying unwritten rules.

The nature of this movement and its source of legitimacy should not be lost on any politician or government official. The Obama administration's current strategy is prudent – issuing statements of empathy with universal values while leaving the judgement on the election in the hands of the Iranian public. Given the history of U.S. - Iranian relations and the extent to which Mousavi's movement is channeling a uniquely Iranian identity and the “letter” of the Islamic Revolution, any U.S. “involvement” would easily be twisted by the authorities as a symbol of western hegemony and interventionism. While, clearly, the Khameni government will, no matter what, attempt to scapegoat the U.S., without any factual basis, they are inherently undermined. The Iranian people do not follow Khameni blindly and unfounded spin on his part will only further reinforce his detached and alienated public image. Unfortunately, some politicians have decided, either naively or shrewdly, to brazenly insert themselves into the conversation. We are seeing Republican Rep. Mike Pence calling for a broad, sweeping moral U.S. backing of the protest movement. Senator McCain has expressed similar sentiments and Joe Lieberman is demanding a Reagan-esque “tear down this wall” proclamation.

Even if one assumes that there is something to be gained in a grand proclamation (a legitimate question and an issue debated within the movement), these particular “advocates” are definitely not the most genuine. One should recall that up until now, Ahmadinejad's nuclear crazy talk led many in the conservative foreign policy circle to “give up” on any constructive negotiations and instead threaten massive economic sanctions and even all-out war. These three individuals were likewise a part. Just one year ago, Mike Pence sponsored a resolution endorsing economic sanctions and isolation on the Iranian people, an act that, as he put it, would “take a stand against Iran.” John McCain joked about a bombing. Lieberman went as far as to actually suggest border strikes. All of these would have been interpreted as aggressive moves, fomenting anti-U.S. fervor and giving the hardliners even more power within the regime. It is strange that these supporters of the Iranian people would even consider such actions.

But the apparent hypocrisy here is a minor afterthought, almost expected as a result of the complete re-writing of the co-ordinates of American discourse on Iran. The sheer reversal of discourse here is not a time for simply indignation, but rather recognition of the power of these protests. One of Zizek's comments in “Use Your Illusions” is particularly useful here:

The paradigmatic cynic tells you confidentially: ‘But don’t you see that it is all really about money/power/sex, that professions of principle or value are just empty phrases which count for nothing?’ What the cynics don’t see is their own naivety, the naivety of their cynical wisdom which ignores the power of illusions.

The reason Obama’s victory generated such enthusiasm is not only that, against all odds, it really happened: it demonstrated the possibility of such a thing happening. The same goes for all great historical ruptures – think of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although we all knew about the rotten inefficiency of the Communist regimes, we didn’t really believe that they would disintegrate – like Kissinger, we were all victims of cynical pragmatism. Obama’s victory was clearly predictable for at least two weeks before the election, but it was still experienced as a surprise.

That is the real impact here. In the U.S. foreign policy circle, the protests have rattled the sense of cynicism around the Islamic Republic. Where simply years ago, some policymakers were ready to go to war with an unshakable, unmoving, irrational “enemy,” now, they are confronted with a dynamic, changing nation where the simple line of “containment” no longer functions. While the reformist fervor that fueled this movement was certainly existent and simmering within Iranian political culture for years, the internal “pragmatism” still assumed an unchanging administration, rejecting any agency on the part of the reformers.

But what is the significance of this movement? What will be the aftermath? The “pragmatic” commentators have begun to dissect it. The American Enterprise Institute's Danielle Pletka is already pronouncing it dead on arrival, calling it “little more than a symbolic protest, crushed by the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.” An article in Foreign Policy by Ranj Alaaldin stated that “anyone believing Mousavi would be the one to unclench the Iranian fist for a hand-in-hand partnership of peace with the United States is guilty of wishful thinking.” After noting Mousavi's anti-Western credentials, Alaaldin then shifts the argument to pure power politics, emphasizing the futility of Mousavi's position within the structure of the clerical leadership. While he concedes that the movement behind Mousavi could force the Supreme Leader to take public opinion into account and will live on, he ultimately dismisses such a “wishful” notion and suggests that Khameni will simply further his hardline position, a view bolstered by Khameni's most recent proclamations.

Yet something is missing here. What these analyses fail to consider is the fundamental framework change that a non-violent movement creates, something much more broad and idealistic than a question of power. The asymmetry between the state forces of Khameni and the protesters demonstrate the nature of a movement of ideals, a rewriting of the rules of the game. If one looks simply at a 'realist' analysis of power, it is clear that the state has the obvious upper-hand. Given the nature of modern military and security technology, it is impossible to confront any state on its own framework. What a non-violent movement of this type does, however, is reject the traditional mode of confrontation that states are accustomed to (war). By refusing to make the violent move that would legitimate state reprisal (on the grounds of security and self-defense, staples of the realist system), the protesters have shifted the battle away from a question of who has power to a question of who has legitimacy. Here, the protesters have already won, by nature of their own existence. Their message is a complete co-option of the “idealistic” pretenses behind the Khameni government's rule. It is a reading of the “letter” of Islam against a state that validates itself through religion. The vivid and global reach of the “green tide” has demonstrated that the reformists will not go unheard.

As Khameni's most recent speech has demonstrated, it is possible that the state will further crack down on the protesters. However, his hesitation (and pretenses toward concession) demonstrate the desperation in this act. By attacking a group that has established such credibility among the Iranian people, he will destroy any idealistic legitimacy behind a government rooted in the Islamic Revolution. If the reign and overthrow of the Shah is any example, Iranians, especially those who are politically active, will not allow a government based only in shows of force to continue. Ideology is integral.

The power of this movement lies in opening new possibilities by doing the impossible. Its actions are the Kantian “signs” that represent the possibility of progress, and the realization of ideals. While the world has yet to see what will be the outcome of the protests, it has undoubtedly experienced a sharp paradigm shift, a problematization of what it sees as “inevitable.” Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from Iran is how so often, what was once seen as irrational seems so sensible and easily rationalized once it occurs. As Zizek put it “A true act creates the conditions of its own possibility.”